A Change in the Environment of Plea Bargaining: Using the Inspiration of Administrative Procedural Safeguards Like NEPA to Add Process Protections by Jedick, Jared R.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 5 
2014 
A Change in the Environment of Plea Bargaining: Using the 
Inspiration of Administrative Procedural Safeguards Like NEPA to 
Add Process Protections 
Jared R. Jedick 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Legal Profession 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jared R. Jedick, A Change in the Environment of Plea Bargaining: Using the Inspiration of Administrative 
Procedural Safeguards Like NEPA to Add Process Protections, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1325 (2014). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1325 
A CHANGE IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF PLEA 
BARGAINING: USING THE INSPIRATION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
LIKE NEPA TO ADD PROCESS PROTECTIONS  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plea bargaining has evolved into the most prominent way criminal 
justice is administered in the United States today,
1
 even though it is met 
with general disdain in legal academic circles.
2
 Recently, the issue of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process 
was raised twice before the Supreme Court of the United States, bringing 
the process to the forefront of national attention.
3
 In Lafler v. Cooper, the 
Supreme Court determined that the petitioner was prejudiced by his 
counsel’s deficient performance in advising him to reject a plea offer and 
go to trial, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel.
4
 He was therefore entitled to be reoffered the plea 
 
 
 1. “[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-
seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty 
pleas.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). See also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) (“Most criminal prosecutions are settled 
without trial.”). 
 2. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652 
(1981); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 
43 (1988); Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining 
Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 887–88 (1980) (“The unconstitutional conditions doctrine seems to 
present a serious question about the constitutional validity of the practice of plea bargaining . . . . If the 
right to trial without self-incrimination is a fundamental constitutional right, any state attempt to deter 
its exercise should violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment unless the state can 
demonstrate a justification sufficient to meet the stringent ‘compelling interest test.’ If the right to trial 
without self-incrimination is fundamental, plea bargaining should be found unconstitutional unless the 
state is able to show that it is the least restrictive means available to effectuate a compelling state 
objective.”) (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the 
Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564, 564–65 (1977) (“Plea bargaining has provoked almost 
universal criticism among commentators. Some have urged its abolition, while others, recognizing the 
inevitability of a low-cost bargaining system, have proposed reforms to ameliorate plea bargaining’s 
deviations from the traditional model. Specifically, commentators have addressed such problems as the 
sentencing irrationalities of plea bargaining, the coercive impact of plea concessions upon the 
defendant, the need to regulate abuses of prosecutorial discretion, and the risk that innocent defendants 
will plead guilty. Commentators, however, generally have not recognized that, despite these defects, 
plea bargaining has several potential advantages, in addition to lower costs, over the traditional 
model—greater accuracy, reduction of sentencing disparities, and increased self-determination by the 
defendant, who is given more control over sentencing. In devising structural reforms of plea 
bargaining, then, it is essential not only to remedy the problems associated with plea bargaining, but 
also to build upon its theoretical advantages over the traditional model.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 3. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376; Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).  
 4. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390–91.  
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deal by the state and to have the state court determine whether sentencing 
should be reconsidered.
5
 In Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court also 
found ineffective assistance of counsel based upon defense counsel’s 
failure to report a formal plea offer to his client.
6
 In response to the 
holdings in these two cases, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia stated 
in his fiery dissent:  
With those words from this and the companion case, the Court 
today opens a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal 
procedure: plea-bargaining law. The ordinary criminal process has 
become too long, too expensive, and unpredictable, in no small part 
as a consequence of an intricate federal Code of Criminal Procedure 
imposed on the States by this Court in pursuit of perfect justice.
7
 
With these two cases, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the legitimacy of 
plea bargaining and cemented its place as the most important means by 
which criminal convictions are administered in this country.
8
 Plea 
bargaining can no longer be ignored as an undesirable but necessary 
byproduct of our criminal justice system. It includes procedural and 
substantive rights that will be recognized and protected by the United 
States Supreme Court.
9
 Lafler and Frye demonstrate that it is essential to 
develop an effective but cost-effective system by which to manage and 
provide oversight for the plea-bargaining process. 
Plea bargaining involves a great deal of prosecutorial discretion. In 
fact, American University law professor Angela J. Davis stated that 
“[u]nchecked power in the hands of prosecutors is as much a threat to our 
democracy as it is with any other government official, if not more.”10 The 
prosecutor is normally able to choose the charge and recommend a 
 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
 7. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 8. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The plea bargaining process is a subject 
worthy of regulation, since it is the means by which most criminal convictions are obtained.”). 
 9. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1386–87; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985). 
 10. Angela J. Davis, Prosecutors’ Overreaching Goes Unchecked, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2012, 
7:00 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/19/do-prosecutors-have-too-much-power/ 
federal-proscutors-have-way-too-much-power (“[T]he charging and plea bargaining decisions are 
made behind closed doors, and prosecutors are not required to justify or explain these decisions to 
anyone. If a prosecutor treats two similarly situated defendants differently—charging one but not the 
other or offering a better plea offer to one—it is almost impossible to challenge such differential 
treatment. The lack of transparency in the prosecution function also leads to misconduct, like the 
failure to turn over exculpatory evidence—a common occurrence made famous by the prosecutors in 
the Duke lacrosse and Senator Ted Stevens cases.”). 
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sentence.
11
 This large amount of power places the prosecutor in the 
position of making unilateral decisions that will directly affect a criminal 
defendant and will ultimately direct the likely result of any future plea 
bargain.
12
 In light of this immense power vested in a single individual, it 
becomes necessary to consider the implications of this pervasive and 
immensely powerful system and how to monitor and control it. But plea 
bargaining cannot be controlled through a purely adversarial model. 
Instead, this Note suggests that we should look to the plea-bargaining 
process through the lens of an administrative model.
13
 
With the rise of plea bargaining, criminal justice has evolved from a 
purely adversarial system of trials and litigated justice in which the 
decisions are made by judge or jury to a system of administrative justice 
where the prosecutor makes the most important decisions in charging and 
plea bargaining.
14
 Because of the overloaded, criminal dockets across the 
country stemming from overcriminalization,
15
 the traditional adversarial 
process of trials protected by rules of evidence and zealous advocacy on 
both sides has given way as the criminal justice system has tried to find 
ways to deal with complex criminal matters as quickly and efficiently as 
 
 
 11. McCoy, supra note 2, at 896–97 (“The prosecutor’s power over sentencing lies primarily in 
his discretion to choose to seek conviction on multiple charges if the defendant demands trial, and to 
promise to drop some charges if the defendant pleads guilty to the remaining ones. The prosecutor may 
also offer to reduce a charge in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2117 (1998). This Note more specifically looks in its conclusion to analogize plea bargaining 
to the administrative process used in the National Environmental Policy Act.   
 14. See id. at 2118 (“The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, I want to describe more 
realistically the theory and practice of plea bargaining in the United States, so as to defend and explain 
the purposes it serves. And second, I want to situate that practice with respect to the 
adversarial/inquisitorial distinction. I will attempt to show how the practice of plea bargaining, which 
in ideological terms is often used as the very symbol of the distinction between the adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems, in practice tends to soften the distinction between them. In fact, I will claim, the 
American system as it actually operates in most cases looks much more like what common lawyers 
would describe as a non-adversarial, administrative system of justice than like the adversarial model 
they idealize.”). 
 15. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 713 (2005) (“A 
recent report concluded that the erratic body of federal law has now swelled to more than four 
thousand offenses that carry criminal punishment, and other works have noted similar upsurges in the 
number of crimes at the state level.”) (footnote omitted). Luna attributes the overcriminalization 
phenomenon to a large extent on the spread of the administrative state and the creation of various 
administrative offenses that become criminal, such as “catching lobsters with something other than a 
‘conventional’ trap.” Id. at 716. He identifies factors to the overciminalization phenomenon: 
“(1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that overextend culpability; (4) crimes 
without judicial authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or pretextual 
enforcement of petty violations.” Id. at 717.  
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possible.
16
 With this focus, it becomes easy for the wheels of justice to 
move too quickly and mistakes to be made. Heavy caseload burdens lie on 
both the prosecutor and defense attorney alike, as the sheer volume of 
criminal proceedings and overloaded criminal dockets lead attorneys who 
do not have the necessary time to properly consider each case to make 
hasty decisions. This is in part because very few of the protections one 
would find in a traditional adversarial trial are found in the plea-bargaining 
process, except for the right to effective assistance of counsel discussed 
above.
17
 If the criminal justice system and plea bargaining is viewed as an 
administrative system of justice, then it becomes necessary to put in place 
administrative-style safeguards.  
Inspiration for such administrative safeguards can be taken from the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which establishes a broad 
administrative mandate to administrative agencies to take certain 
environmental concerns into account when making decisions and 
document their analysis without interfering with the agency’s discretion 
itself.
18
 This idea of ensuring procedure by documentation can be extended 
to the essentially administrative task of offering a plea bargain. In order to 
provide the necessary oversight, this Note suggests prosecutors should be 
required, after the formal plea offer, to provide a short document detailing 
the reasons why a certain deal was offered to a supervising attorney or 
prosecutor for review. Even if the supervising attorney merely glances at 
the document without providing thorough oversight, the procedure itself 
would force the prosecutor to carefully consider the reasons used to justify 
the plea offer and would subject his decision-making to scrutiny without 
removing his prosecutorial discretion. Undoubtedly the vast majority of 
prosecutors take their responsibility to serve justice seriously, and a 
procedure to make explicit the factors they considered in formulating a 
plea offer will usually be followed scrupulously, even without thorough 
oversight. Even if some bad-actor prosecutors are able to slip through the 
cracks, this proposal could significantly lessen unfairness and 
inconsistencies between plea offers by creating a log of past plea offers 
that can be consulted by the prosecutor when making decisions on future 
plea offers. This requirement would also create a reviewable document 
that could be placed under judicial scrutiny
19
 (in the rare event that a 
 
 
 16. Scott, supra note 1, at 1910, 1916.  
 17. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1393 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 
(2012).  
 18. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012). 
 19. See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/9
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defendant/plaintiff could meet the burden of United States v. Armstrong),
20
 
or could be used to evaluate consistency and fairness in plea offers during 
job performance reports and in promotion, hiring, and firing decisions. 
While this would add to the amount of time the prosecutor must spend 
considering the offer, it would not hinder or remove any of his discretion. 
This system would also keep all information relating to plea-bargaining 
decisions in-house, preventing the disclosure of trial strategy to defense 
attorneys.
21
 The additional burden placed upon prosecutors to conduct this 
formal analysis would presumably not add significantly to caseloads, as at 
most it would add the fifteen minutes to a half hour it would take to 
consult previous offers and fill out the form. Finally, it would require no 
new funding for additional prosecutors or investigators, as the current 
prosecutors could handle it themselves.  
Part II of this Note will explore the nature of the American criminal 
justice system today and the place of plea bargaining within that 
framework. The section will explore the pitfalls and criticisms of the plea-
bargaining process, demonstrating the need for some kind of oversight to 
monitor and regulate the process. Part III will describe how plea 
bargaining has come to resemble more of an administrative and 
inquisitorial model, rather than an adversarial one. Finally, in Part IV, 
taking inspiration from the administrative and inquisitorial model and 
NEPA, this Note will examine the possibility of applying procedural 
oversight and guidelines to the plea-bargaining process as a possible 
solution, providing some necessary protections that will help to alleviate 
some of the problems and criticisms associated with plea bargaining.   
 
 
1417–18 (2010); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 29, 31–32 (2002) (“This paper offers a different choice, and points to prosecutorial ‘screening’ as 
the principle alternative to plea bargains. . . . By prosecutorial screening we mean a far more structured 
and reasoned charge selection process than is typical in most prosecutors’ offices in this country. The 
prosecutorial screening system we describe has four interrelated features, all internal to the 
prosecutor’s office: early assessment, reasoned selection, barriers to bargains, and enforcement.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 20. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that in order to gain discovery in a 
selective prosecution claim, the defendant must produce credible evidence that similarly situated 
defendants of other races could have been prosecuted but were not).  
 21. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002) (describing worries of prosecutors of 
having to disclose too much information to defendants during the plea-bargaining process).  
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II. NEGOTIATED PLEA BARGAINING AND ITS ETHICAL ISSUES 
A. Plea Bargaining as Negotiation and Contract 
Plea bargaining has grown to resemble contract law, where the 
protections of the trial process are no longer afforded.
22
 In fact, the manner 
in which most criminal cases are handled would seem so casual and 
expedited as to shock an observer with no knowledge of how the process 
works.
23
 The traditional criminal process involves a trial where a judge or 
jury adjudicates guilt or innocence. The trial involves “tough adversarial 
argument from attorneys for the government and defense, and fair-minded 
decision making from an impartial judge and jury.”24 However, these 
protections do not exist when the focus is on the negotiation between the 
prosecutor and the defense attorney and the trial itself is foregone. As 
professor Graham Hughes of New York University put it:  
[T]he trial has become no more than an occasional adornment on 
the vast surface of the criminal process. This fundamentally 
disorients the system, for our professed constitutional model 
depends upon the setting of a trial. . . . The trial in turn looks 
forward to careful review at the appellate level. But of what value 
are our ideals and our learning when the trial hardly ever happens?
25
 
The overwhelmingly vast swarm of criminal defendants forces the use of 
plea bargaining to cope with the tremendous volume of cases.
26
 Further, 
the lack of a sufficient investigation of the facts and the opportunity to 
present evidence makes it even more difficult to fairly determine the 
 
 
 22. Scott, supra note 1, at 1910. See also Michael D. Cicchini, Broken Government Promises: A 
Contract-Based Approach to Enforcing Plea Bargains, 38 N.M. L. REV. 159 (2008) (suggesting that a 
possible solution to policing violations of and reneging on plea bargains by prosecutors is to use a 
contract-based approach to enforcement); Jennifer Rae Taylor, Restoring the Bargain: Examining 
Post-Plea Sentence Enhancement as an Unconscionable Violation of Contract Law, 48 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 129 (2011).  
 23. Scott, supra note 1, at 1911–12 (“Most cases are disposed of by means that seem 
scandalously casual: a quick conversation in a prosecutor’s office or a courthouse hallway between 
attorneys familiar with only the basics of the case, with no witnesses present, leading to a proposed 
resolution that is then ‘sold’ to both the defendant and the judge. To a large extent, this kind of horse 
trading determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some 
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”) (footnote omitted). 
 24. Id. at 1911.  
 25. Graham Hughes, Pleas Without Bargains, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 753, 753–54 (1980–81). 
 26. John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the Bazaar With the 
Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 216 (1977). See also Luna, supra note 15, at 713 (describing 
what the author calls the “overcriminalization phenomenon,” involving a substantial increase in the 
number of criminal offenses in the country today).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/9
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defendant’s fate at the plea-bargaining stage.27 Also, the absence of the 
safeguards present at trial makes it easy to coerce a defendant into 
accepting a plea bargain “because of the threat of much harsher penalties 
after trial.”28 This calls into question whether a plea agreed to by a 
defendant was truly made voluntarily.
29
 As Professor Conrad G. Brunk 
elucidates, if the defendant cannot refuse a plea offer, then it is coerced.
30
 
For example, someone who does not have the means to afford to go 
through the entire process of a prolonged and expensive trial would have 
no choice but to accept a plea offer.
31
 Similarly, the psychological threat of 
greater punishment could induce a defendant to accept a plea deal even 
when innocent.
32
 There are also risks that the government might renege on 
a plea bargain.
33
 The interests of the criminal defendant are usually to 
 
 
 27. Scott, supra note 1, at 1912. See Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 
86 ETHICS, Jan. 1976, at 93, 105–06, and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly 
Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 142–44 (1986). 
 28. Scott, supra note 1, at 1912. See also McCoy, supra note 2, at 893 (“In plea bargaining, the 
state attempts to induce defendants to plead guilty by threatening to impose a harsher sentence should 
they be convicted at trial than it would impose if they pleaded guilty. The state’s only purpose for this 
sentencing disparity is to deter demands for trial by penalizing those defendants who demand trial and 
are then convicted. The state’s paramount motives in seeking to avoid trial are to save money and 
assure conviction.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 29. Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of Voluntariness and Coercion in the Negotiated Plea, 13 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 527 (1979). See also Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” 
Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 771–72 (1998) 
(“The most serious concern with plea bargaining pertains to the possible coercion of innocent 
defendants to plead guilty. While some express this criticism as the coercion of guilty pleas based on 
the unequal bargaining power of the state, . . . the true concern for this criticism [is] the increased risk 
of innocent defendants pleading guilty. The unilateral power of the state to determine the sanctions for 
different offenses can provide a broad range of options for prosecutors to overcharge or threaten to 
pursue the most severe penalty if the defendant goes to trial. The harsh penalties associated with 
conviction at trial provide the prosecutor with significant leverage to persuade defendants to plead 
guilty. In some cases, this may result in innocent defendants being faced with a choice where the cost 
of pleading guilty outweighs the risks of going to trial. Risk-averse defendants will accept the state’s 
offer and plead guilty. The incentives inherent in plea bargaining, therefore, create an increased risk of 
innocent defendants receiving punishment.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 30. Brunk, supra note 29, at 550. 
 31. Id. at 551 (“A person who does not have the physical means to go to trial cannot refuse an 
alternative to trial no matter how bad the alternative is. . . . A person without access to counsel, or one 
for whom the costs of trial would impose severe financial or other hardship, is under such duress that 
he cannot refuse a poor offer.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 32. Id. (“It is not totally implausible to suggest that the risk of certain types of sanctions (e.g., 
death) or conviction of a highly opprobrious charge (e.g., child molestation) could drive some 
defendants to accept a poor offer in order to avoid them.”). 
 33. Cicchini, supra note 22, at 159 (“[T]he government compromises the integrity of the system 
when it makes promises as part of a plea bargain and then reneges on those promises, often after 
obtaining from the defendant the very benefit for which it bargained. This negative impact is 
magnified when the government when the government reneges without good cause due to its own 
negligence or even bad faith. When courts refuse to hold the government to its end of the bargain, the 
court encourage further similar behavior.”). 
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avoid conviction or incur the smallest possible punishment.
34
 The interests 
of the state are usually to accurately and cheaply discover guilty 
defendants and apply the appropriate punishment to them.
35
 Thus, the 
whole plea-bargaining process becomes a negotiation where both sides try 
to come to an agreement that will maximize their individual interests. As 
Thomas R. McCoy and Michael J. Mirra put it, “plea bargaining is the 
process by which both the state’s interest in identifying and punishing 
criminals efficiently and the defendant’s interest in reducing punishment 
are maximized in an economic sense.”36 Traditionally, scholars have either 
accepted the plea-bargaining process as necessary, or rejected it 
completely.
37
 Because of the lack of trial protections in the negotiated 
plea-bargaining process, the threats of unfairness to criminal defendants 
can become very real.  
According to Milton Heumann, case pressure and the adaptation of 
attorneys to the local criminal court has led to the gradual shift over time 
from a focus on trials to a focus on plea bargaining.
38
 As time goes on, 
people involved in the plea-bargaining process can even evolve from 
having a distaste for it to being strongly in favor of it.
39
 Thus, the very 
workings of the court itself and the attractiveness of efficiency become 
very attractive over time to prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge alike. 
Plea bargaining contains many advantages that make it very addictive, 
such as greater flexibility in dealing with caseloads.
40
 This inescapable 
 
 
 34. McCoy, supra note 2, at 894.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 895. 
 37. Wright & Miller, supra note 19, at 30–31 (“Some take the system more or less as it is. They 
accept negotiated pleas in the ordinary course of events, either because such a system produces good 
results or because it is inevitable. They might identify some exceptional cases that create an intolerable 
risk of convincing innocent defendants, or unusual cases where there are special reasons to doubt the 
knowing and voluntary nature of the defendant’s plea. These special cases might call for some 
regulation. But the mine run of cases, in this view, must be resolved with a heavy dose of plea bargains 
and a sprinkling of trials. Then there are those who leave it, arguing that our system’s reliance on 
negotiated guilty pleas is fundamentally mistaken. Some call for a complete ban on negotiated guilty 
pleas. Others, doubting that an outright ban is feasible, still encourage a clear shift to more short trials 
to resolve criminal charges. Restoring the criminal trial to its rightful place at the center of criminal 
justice might require major changes in public spending, and it might take a lifetime, but these critics 
say the monstrosity of the current system demands such a change.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 38. See James E. Bond, Book Review, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837 (1979). See generally 
MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS (1978) (discussed by Bond). 
 39. See id. 
 40. Guidorizzi, supra note 29, at 765–67 (“Plea bargaining provides district attorneys with 
greater flexibility in disposing of the criminal caseload. District attorneys often operate with limited 
resources and plea bargaining provides a quick, efficient method of handling a large caseload. . . . The 
quick disposition of cases allows public defenders to give more time and effort to cases they consider 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/9
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attractiveness makes it very easy to ignore the dangers of plea bargaining, 
further necessitating safeguards to ensure that plea bargaining does not 
become too casual, especially in the high-paced, high-pressure atmosphere 
of criminal adjudication.  
B. Substantial Burdens on Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys 
Over-burdened caseloads only add to the issues the prosecutor and the 
defense attorney must deal with. First of all, funding for indigent defense 
is woefully inadequate.
41
 Further, the large caseloads of prosecutors mean 
that they do not have the time to always offer well-thought-out plea deals 
to criminal defendants.
42
 Instead, they are often forced to work quickly, 
sometimes leading to mistakes.
43
 Even a former Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Missouri deplored the overworked nature of prosecutors 
and public defenders in his state.
44
  
 
 
more trial-worthy. Attorneys who are not associated with a public defender office but are representing 
indigent clients may also find it in their direct financial interests to dispose of cases quickly. . . . In 
exchange for pleading guilty and avoiding trial, defendants can receive sentence-related concessions 
from the prosecutor or the dismissal of some of the charges in their indictment. . . . The quick 
disposition of cases through plea bargaining may conserve judicial resources inasmuch as the amount 
of time for a guilty plea is less than a trial. . . . Plea bargains allow the victim to gain an immediate 
sense of closure along with the knowledge that the defendant will not go unpunished for the crime.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 41. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National 
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006) (providing several enlightening anecdotes of the criminal 
defense system’s failing, and identifying Georgia, Virginia, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and North 
Dakota as states that have failing indigent defense systems).  
 42. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 261, 262–63 (2011) (“In 
recent decades, legal scholars have devoted enormous attention to two problems in the American 
criminal justice system: the appalling underfunding of indigent defense and intentional prosecutorial 
misconduct. Both problems are deeply troubling, and the academic literature helpfully serves to 
spotlight the problems and encourage reform. Remarkably, however, there is virtually no scholarship 
focusing on the opposite side of the coin. Scholars have failed to notice that prosecutors in large 
counties are often as overburdened as public defenders and appointed counsel. In some jurisdictions, 
individual prosecutors handle more than one thousand felony cases per year. Prosecutors often have 
hundreds of open felony cases at a time and multiple murder, robbery, and sexual assault cases set for 
trial on any given day. Prosecutors in many large cities have caseloads far in excess of the 
recommended guidelines that scholars often cite to criticize the caseloads of public defenders. Quite 
simply, many prosecutors are asked to commit malpractice on a daily basis by handling far more cases 
than any lawyer can competently manage.”) (footnote omitted). 
 43. Id. at 263 (“While some of these cases involve unscrupulous prosecutors, far more often the 
errors are inadvertent because prosecutors are too busy to properly focus on their cases or because they 
have not received proper guidance from senior lawyers who are terribly overburdened themselves.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 44. Hon. William Ray Price, Jr., Chief Justice Delivers 2010 State of the Judiciary Address, 66 J. 
MO. B. 68, 69–70 (2010) (“[O]ur public defenders and prosecutors are also stressed to the point of 
breaking. . . . In some ways prosecutors are the most powerful individuals in the criminal justice 
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The nature of the job of the criminal prosecutor places heavy 
expectations on the individual attorney who aspires to that profession. The 
burden on prosecutors is further exacerbated by the very nature of a 
criminal prosecutor, a role that places expectations of higher standards of 
justice and ethical uprightness.
45
 Indeed, prosecutors should be held to 
higher standards because of the powerful position that they are placed in 
our system of criminal justice which calls on them to make these judgment 
calls without the aid of trial or even an impartial decision-maker.
46
  
Similarly, defense attorneys are placed under a substantial burden by 
large caseloads and an inability to cope with the sheer volume. Mary Sue 
Backus and Paul Marcus point to the public defender systems across the 
country as examples of the troubles that defense counsel encounter.
47
 They 
assert that, similar to the situation with prosecutors, the public defender 
system as it exists is inadequate to provide for indigent defense because 
funding does not keep up with heavy caseloads.
48
 They cite the example of 
a public defender in Florida who felt it was necessary to address the 
problem by informing his fellow attorneys:  
[P]ublic defenders are often ill-informed about their clients’ cases 
and circumstances before advising them to take pleas offered by 
prosecutors at arraignment. “It’s not fair to make life-altering 
decisions while handcuffed to a chair with fifty people standing 
around. . . . They meet with an attorney for sixty seconds, then they 
plead guilty and surrender their rights.”49 
Backus and Marcus point to a lack of funding, overwhelming caseloads, 
and deficient salaries for public defenders as primary reasons for this 
problem.
50
 Further, it is hard to show that the presence of counsel 
 
 
system. They decide whether charges are brought. They decide what charges are brought. They decide 
what plea agreements are made. If we want these decisions to be made well, we need people making 
them who are not underpaid and overworked.”). 
 45. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001). 
 46. Id. at 397–99. Professor Davis worries that the current set of constitutional checks on the 
power of prosecutors is insufficient to prevent abuses. Id. 
 47. Backus & Marcus, supra note 41.  
 48. Id. at 1045–63.  
 49. Id. at 1033–34. 
 50. Id. at 1034–35, 1045–63.  
Poor people account for more than 80% of the individuals prosecuted. These criminal 
defendants plead guilty approximately 90% of the time. In those cases, more than half the 
lawyers entered pleas for their clients without spending significant time on the cases, without 
interviewing witnesses or filing motion. Sometimes they barely spoke with their clients. 
Id. at 1034 (footnote omitted). 
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significantly aids defendants because of all of the issues with burdensome 
caseloads and a lack of time.
51
 Although the Supreme Court has 
guaranteed that indigent defendants must have access to defense counsel at 
the state’s expense,52 it did not provide any explanation or guidance as to 
how the states’ indigent defense systems should be run or funded.53 
C. Ethical Considerations and Pitfalls 
Based on this backdrop of heavy caseloads and the need to move 
quickly to keep up with them, a number of ethical issues involving plea 
bargaining become evident. First, in the plea-bargaining process, the 
prosecutor is an incredibly powerful entity. As Justice Robert Jackson put 
it, the prosecutor has “more control over life, liberty, and reputation than 
any other person in America.”54 An even more colorful description of 
prosecutors given by Geraldine Szott Moohr is that they perform “the role 
of god” or have obtained “heroic status.”55 These descriptors of the role of 
 
 
 51. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 
1179, 1180 (1975) (“The Supreme Court and other observers of the plea bargaining process have 
relied heavily on the assumption that criminal defense attorneys will, almost invariably, urge their 
clients to choose the course that is in the clients’ best interests. Although this assumption is entirely 
natural and corresponds to the function that defense attorneys are intended to perform in our system of 
justice, it merits examination in terms of the actual workings of the criminal justice system. This 
article therefore explores the extent to which the presence of counsel does provide significant 
safeguard of fairness in guilty plea negotiation. It concludes that current conceptions of the defense 
attorney’s role are often more romanticized than real.”). See also Sonia Y. Lee, Comment, OC’s PD’s 
Feeling the Squeeze—The Right to Counsel: In Light of Budget Cuts, Can the Orange County Office of 
the Public Defender Provide Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1895, 1897 
(1996) (“The reality is that there are too many indigent defendants and not enough public funds or 
attorneys. This lack of funding for public defenders is directly responsible for the perceived dumping 
problem: the less money supplied to the office, the less investigative and medical expert support, the 
fewer public defenders employed, and hence the fewer public defenders available for indigent defense. 
Consequently, indigent defendants receive inadequate assistance of counsel.”) (footnote omitted). 
 52. Roberta G. Mandel, The Appointment of Counsel to Indigent Defendants Is Not Enough: 
Budget Cuts Render The Right to Counsel Virtually Meaningless, 83 FLA. B.J. 43 (2009) (Citing the 
cases of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), 
as examples of judicial mandates to provide counsel for indigents at the state’s expense), available at 
https://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/Author/8455F3AA138089EE8525758A004
AEA51. 
 53. Mandel, supra note 52, at 43 (“Although the Court’s mandates to provide counsel to 
indigents charged with felonies and misdemeanors led to a rapid increase in criminal defense work, the 
Court provided no guidance or models for organizing or funding states’ indigent criminal defense 
systems. The Court gave the states broad discretion to fashion policies and laws to effectuate the 
overall goals of effective assistance of counsel and fair trials. Consistent with the Court’s dedication to 
federalism, states were free to adopt whatever system they wished.”). 
 54. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from 
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 165 (2004) 
(quoting Justice Robert Jackson). 
 55. Id. at 165 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  
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the prosecutor demonstrate the incredible ethical responsibility of a 
prosecutor and the high standard they must meet given the amount of 
power that they receive. It is also possible for a prosecutor to engage in 
misconduct, and although rare, it does sometimes happen.
56
 Despite the 
rare case of willful misconduct, the majority of problems arise from the 
overburdened caseloads and overworked attorneys that have to work from 
within the system. This combination of factors leads to the mistakes made 
by prosecutors and defense attorneys alike. A second concern is that 
prosecutors and defense attorneys are making decisions about plea offers 
and negotiations based, at least in part, on their prior relationships with 
each other and not based solely on the disposition and facts of the case and 
defendant before them. The examples of lack of contact that criminal 
defense attorneys have with their clients suggest that there must be an 
alternative basis for the way plea-bargaining decisions are made.
57
  
The rules governing the conduct of prosecutors place lofty goals upon 
them that will be hard to live up to. The ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Prosecution and Defense Function lay out in Rule 2.8 that the 
prosecutor should strive to avoid any appearance or reality that would cast 
doubt on the independence of the office.
58
 There is concern that lawyers 
involved in criminal justice are not adequately supervised or disciplined, 
 
 
 56. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1061 (2009) (“Much prosecutorial 
misconduct stems from the fact that law schools and district attorneys’ offices often provide too little 
training demonstrating where to draw the line between aggressive prosecution and misconduct.”). See 
also BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT (2007); JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2003); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional 
Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1999); Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in 
Addressing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391 (2011); Maximo Langer, 
Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American 
Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 225 (2006) (“The basic premise is that whenever the 
prosecutor’s plea proposal violates certain rights of the defendant—rights that define what the baseline 
is—the plea proposal is coercive and the defendant’s guilty plea is involuntary. In that situation the 
prosecutor acts as the sole adjudicator of the criminal case.”). 
 57. Backus & Marcus, supra note 41, at 1031–35 (“An attorney was found to have entered pleas 
of guilty for more than 300 defendants without ever taking a matter to trial. In one case from 
Mississippi, a woman accused of a minor shoplifting offense spent a year in jail, before any trial, 
without even speaking to her appointed counsel. In some places, one lawyer may handle more than 
twenty criminal cases in a single day, with a flat rate of $50 per case. In others, some defense lawyers 
providing counsel to indigent defendants under a state contract system can be responsible for more 
than 1000 cases per year. In one major metropolitan area, San Jose, California, numerous defense 
attorneys failed to take simple steps to investigate and prepare their cases for trial. Some attorneys 
went to trial without ever meeting their clients outside the courtroom. Some neglected to interview 
obvious alibi witnesses. Some accepted without question reports from prosecutors’ medical and 
forensic experts that were ripe for challenge.”) (footnotes omitted) . 
 58. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 2.8 (1st 
ed. 1970). 
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but the rule does not prevent friendly relationships between lawyers on 
opposing sides of a criminal proceeding.
59
 Prosecution Function 3-1.2 of 
the 2010 Proposed Revisions of Standards for Criminal Justice describes 
the prosecutor as an “administrator of justice . . . advocate . . . officer of 
the court . . . seeker of justice . . . servant of both justice and the public 
interest . . . problem-solver, not merely an advocate . . . community 
relations assistant . . . reformer of the criminal justice system . . . ethical 
lawyer.”60 These high-minded ideals, defining what it means to be a 
prosecutor in a plea-bargaining world, can only be achieved through 
internal compliance by the prosecutors themselves.
61
 External controls are 
likely to be ineffective, since the prosecutor must retain a great deal of 
discretion in the criminal process.
62
  
Questions of the ethical obligations of the prosecutor have long been a 
concern for legal scholars.
63
 The current ABA Standards “describe the 
prosecutor as ‘an administrator of justice, an advocate and an officer of the 
court,’ and require that the prosecutor use ‘sound discretion,’ ‘seek 
justice,’ and ‘reform and improve the administration of criminal 
justice.’”64 According to Susan W. Brenner and James Geoffrey Durham, 
 
 
 59. Lissa Griffin & Stacy Caplow, Changes to the Culture of Adversarialness: Endorsing 
Candor, Cooperation, and Civility in Relationships Between Prosecutor and Defense Counsel, 38 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 845–50 (2011) (“Relationships between prosecutors and defense counsel 
are infamously rocky. . . . these relationships tend to be riddled with a level of distrust and disrespect 
that hardens over time.”). 
 60. Id. at 850–51.  
 61. Id. at 851 (“Of course, in carrying out all of these high principles and grave duties, the 
prosecutor still has enormous discretion and great advantages of power, information and resources, yet 
only professional pride, self-respect, and an internal moral compass can truly induce compliance.”). 
 62. Id. For an intriguing alternative to plea bargaining that involves plea mediation, see Brandon 
J. Lester, Note, System Failure: The Case for Supplanting Negotiation with Mediation in Plea 
Bargaining, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 563, 584–85 (2005) (“Mediation can ameliorate many of 
the problems associated with the use of negotiations in the criminal justice system through the neutral 
oversight offered by a trained mediator. By utilizing plea mediations instead of plea negotiations, the 
system could reap the benefits of enhanced communication overseen by a neutral presence employed 
specifically to lead the parties toward a mutually agreeable disposition. Such a mediated plea 
agreement system would improve the criminal justice system in numerous ways and add several 
benefits not currently offered.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 63. See Gershowitz, supra note 56, at 1105. The author believes that there is a need for an 
independent third party to publicly identify prosecutors who have committed serious misconduct in 
order to provide a deterrent. See also Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and 
Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 159 (2011) (“Where the primary protections against wrongful 
convictions—the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt—are systematically 
circumvented by plea bargaining, there is real cause for concern about public confidence in the legal 
system.”). 
 64. Griffin & Caplow, supra note 59, at 850 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2 (3d ed. 1993)).  
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there are several system conflicts that a prosecutor must confront.
65
 They 
are politicians who must answer to an electorate, advocates who 
vigorously strive to convict, and administrators of justice.
66
 There is also a 
strong possibility of past roles influencing current relationships that could 
raise a conflict of interest for a prosecutor.
67
 The Arkansas case, Sanders v. 
State, even went so far as to address the situation of an alleged criminal 
relationship between a prosecutor and a defense attorney.
68
 Although a 
criminal relationship between a prosecutor and a defense attorney is rare, 
any kind of inappropriate relationship between prosecutors and defense 
attorneys must be avoided by prosecutors at all costs. And prosecutors are 
not alone in their ethical obligations, as defense attorneys also must meet 
certain standards, including providing the effective assistance of counsel 
described in Lafler and Frye.
69
  
III. PLEA BARGAINING AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
A. Plea Bargaining’s Resemblance to an Administrative System, not 
Adversarial Negotiation 
Plea bargaining has changed the criminal justice system from an 
adversarial system into something more resembling an administrative 
model.
70
 And this change is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, many 
 
 
 65. Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor Conflicts of 
Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 469 (1993).  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Sanders v. State, 98 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Ark. 2003) (“The offenses included attempts to extort 
money from criminal defendants that occurred around the time that Appellant was represented by 
Murphy and prosecuted by Harmon. While it is not clear whether there is any nexus between the two, 
the facts alleged by Appellant in his petition raise more than the mere specter of an improper 
relationship between the prosecutor and defense counsel that may have prejudiced Appellant in his 
trial.”). 
 69. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012); Frye v. Missouri, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 
(2012); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN & DAVID B. WILKINS, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION (5th ed. 2009). See also Aschuler, supra note 51, at 1313 (“The 
problem of providing effective representation within the frame-work of the guilty-plea system is a 
problem that cannot be resolved satisfactorily. Contrary to the assumption of the Supreme Court and 
other observers that plea negotiation ordinarily occurs in an atmosphere of informed choice, private 
defense attorneys, public defenders, and appointed attorneys are all subject to bureaucratic pressures 
and conflicts of interest that seem unavoidable in any regime grounded on the guilty plea. Far from 
safeguarding the fairness of the plea-negotiation process, the defense attorney is himself a frequent 
source of abuse, and no mechanism of reform seems adequate to control the dangers.”). 
 70. Lynch, supra note 13, at 2118.  
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foreign systems follow just such an administrative or inquisitorial model.
71
 
Although at first glance this type of criminal justice system seems to go 
against the common American archetype of adversarialism, it is not 
unreasonable.
72
 As Professor Gerard E. Lynch said in his article, Our 
Administrative System of Criminal Justice:  
[I]t is hardly self-evident that a system in which a responsible 
government official is assigned to investigate allegations of crime, 
by investigative means strictly limited to protect the rights of 
suspects, and then to make decisions based on the results of the 
investigation after hearing evidence and arguments presented by the 
suspect, is beyond the pale of civilization.
73
 
With this in mind, the criminal justice system and its plea-bargaining 
process should not be analyzed in relation or contrast to our idealized 
adversarial model, but instead should be evaluated according to its own 
merits and faults as they exist within an administrative or inquisitorial 
model.
74
  
The primary criticism of the plea-bargaining process is that the 
adversarial judicial process has been removed from the proceedings.
75
 As 
Lynch puts it, “[i]n most guilty plea proceedings, the judge does not have 
enough information to make an intelligent determination of whether the 
defendant’s guilt is even likely, let alone certain.”76 If one were to only 
look at the judicial proceedings, then this criticism would be justified. 
 
 
 71. Id. (“In fact, I will claim, the American system as it actually operates in most cases looks 
much more like what common lawyers would describe as a non-adversarial, administrative system of 
justice than like the adversarial model they idealize.”). See also Moohr, supra note 54, at 168. 
 72. Lynch, supra note 13, at 2124. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 2121 (“The strengths and weaknesses of such a system should be assessed in terms 
more appropriate to its own implicit premises, rather than in comparison to an idealized adversarial 
model. What happens if we think of the American criminal justice system as one in which an 
administrative agency, call it the Department of Justice, administratively decides, subject to judicial 
review, who is worthy of criminal punishment?”). See also Luna & Wade, supra note 19, at 1426 
(“What is of particular interest to us is the extent to which scholars like Professor Langer and Judge 
Lynch have revived a comparative dialogue on the prosecutorial function, looking at the European 
approach for similarities and contrasts, seeking insights or even potential solutions to problems like 
those mentioned above. Generations of American comparativists have explored European criminal law 
and procedure, often as a curiosity but sometimes as an inquiry into the improvement of criminal 
justice on this side of the Atlantic. Some comparative pieces of the early mid-twentieth century 
suggested that American criminal justice would benefit ‘by examining in a sympathetic spirit a system 
which has been worked out by the best minds of continental Europe,’ preparing for a future where the 
terms adversarial and inquisitorial will no longer serve to distinguish criminal processes.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 75. Lynch, supra note 13, at 2122. 
 76. Id. 
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However, to focus on only the judicial proceedings would be a mistake, as 
so much more occurs outside the formal proceedings in the courtroom.
77
 
The prosecutor is a member of the executive branch and his actions must 
be evaluated as such. There are no formal regulations for the prosecutor in 
his administrative role because of our adherence to the traditional 
adversarial model.
78
 Therefore, the entire plea-bargaining process is 
conducted very informally. In fact, the rules of criminal procedure define 
the prosecutor as an autonomous party to an adversarial proceeding, so the 
defendant has no right to present evidence to the prosecutor.
79
 In order to 
overcome these disadvantages, it is necessary to correct the situation by 
creating a new way of looking at the role of the prosecutor in an 
administrative role.  
The prosecutor, as the controlling figure in a criminal case, is subject to 
its own criticisms. First, the prosecutor is supposed to be a party in an 
adversarial process, and having one of the parties to an adversarial system 
become an ultimate decision-maker seems to discredit the system.
80
 This is 
further exacerbated by the perception of the disparity in power and 
resources between the state and a typical criminal defendant.
81
 However, 
these flaws would exist to the same degree in an actual trial as it would in 
the plea-bargaining process.
82
 The problems (frightened and powerless 
defendants with overworked and under-qualified defense attorneys), can 
also be found at all stages of the adjudicatory process.
83
 Why should a 
 
 
 77. Id. at 2123 (“The substantive evaluation of the evidence and assessment of the defendant’s 
responsibility is not made in court at all, but within the executive branch, in the office of the 
prosecutor. The brief formal procedure in court obscures what can be an invisible, but elaborate and 
lengthy process of adjudication of the defendant’s guilt. This process is rarely governed be formal 
legal standards, other than the basic definitions of offenses, and the procedures by which it operates 
are not usually written down anywhere. But it is this process that our alien anthropologist would surely 
identify as the actual adjudication process for criminal cases.”). 
 78. Id. at 2124 (“Most commonly, in all likelihood, the prosecutor simply accepts the results of 
the police investigation, and any process of independent adjudication occurs at the instigation of 
defense counsel. Just as the trial process only comes into play when the defendant contests the 
prosecutor’s judgment, so the administrative process depends on the defendant’s decision to question, 
within the prosecutorial bureaucracy, the conclusions of the police or investigative agency.”). 
 79. Id. (“Notably, the rules of criminal procedure do not give a suspect or defendant a right to be 
heard by, or to present evidence to, the prosecutor. . . . Any discussion between the parties is 
conceived as a species of settlement negotiations, in which a party will participate only to the extent 
that he deems it in his interest to do so.”). 
 80. Id. at 2123. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (“The poor and ill-represented may also fare badly at trial, where the lack of preparation 
or empathy of their lawyers, the prejudices of jurors, and the great resources of the state may equally 
secure an unjust conviction—just as the state may fare badly when an effective and conscientious 
defense lawyer is matched at trial against an inexperienced or poorly-prepared prosecutor.”). 
 83. Id. at 2123. 
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defendant fare any better in a trial with an incompetent and overworked 
attorney than in a plea bargain with that same attorney? Thus, the 
problems that are cited in criticism of plea bargaining are in fact extrinsic 
to it, and the process of plea bargaining should be evaluated separately 
from those criticisms.  
B. Comparison to Inquisitorial Systems 
In order to properly evaluate the role of the prosecutor in the plea-
bargaining process, we can look at plea bargaining in light of the 
inquisitorial and investigative model. Generally, the inquisitorial model 
involves the state as a monolithic entity attempting to discover the truth 
through its own thorough investigation.
84
 As in an inquisitorial system, the 
American prosecutor in plea bargaining decides whether or not someone is 
guilty of a crime based upon an investigation and an evaluation of the facts 
as he receives them.
85
 A useful comparison of the American adversarial 
system with the French inquisitorial system is conducted by Geraldine 
Szott Moohr in her article, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: 
Lessons from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model.
86
 
The adversarial system we use in the United States grew out of the 
common law model of one individual’s making accusations against 
another individual.
87
 Therefore, judges treated both sides as equals and 
allowed them to make their cases to independent decision-makers
88
 with 
the truth being ascertained by the competitive process of adversarial 
parties putting forth evidence against one another.
89
 The inquisitorial 
approach, on the other hand, involved the investigation of criminal matters 
using the power of the state to conduct an inquiry.
90
 The inquisitorial 
system is premised on the idea that it is possible to determine the nature of 
the crime and the parties involved through a thorough investigation.
91
 
 
 
 84. Moohr, supra note 54, at 193. 
 85. See id. at 168 (“The federal system is like an inquisitorial system in that it also resolves 
issues of criminality through investigation, rather than through trial. Unlike an inquisitorial system, 
however, the federal system operates without the benefit of institutional arrangements and procedures 
that provide a counter-weight to prosecutorial power.”). 
 86. Id. at 165. 
 87. Id. at 192–93. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 193. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (“Accordingly, the inquisitorial process centered on the tasks of assembling and screening 
facts. As its name implies, the investigation is the centerpiece of the inquisitorial process. The ultimate 
issue of guilt or innocence is determined through an official inquiry that is initiated and conducted by 
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Therefore, the primary difference between the two systems is the role of 
the prosecutor, whether as an independent investigatory arm of the state, 
or as an equal party with the defendant in an adversarial proceeding.
92
  
In an inquisitorial system, like the one in France, government officials 
are generally in charge of investigating, charging, and trying criminal 
defendants as a branch of the judiciary.
93
 The prosecutor is defined 
differently in the European model, and focuses on his role as an objective 
pursuer of the truth, as opposed to one side of an adversarial process.
94
 The 
prosecutors in that system generally report directly to supervising officials 
who review and correct subordinate officials.
95
 Therefore, the discretion of 
an individual prosecutor in the inquisitorial system is very limited.
96
 This 
contrasts markedly to the American system, where the role of the 
prosecutor as an “independent decision making and discretionary 
authority”97 is the norm and expectation of prosecutors.  
Further differences arise between the French prosecutor and the 
American prosecutor when one analyzes the different backgrounds and 
educations they receive. In the French inquisitorial model, prosecutors are 
selected based on merit right after they come out of law school.
98
 They 
then have to complete two years of an educational program that includes 
internships as well as making a commitment to serve in the magistracy for 
ten years.
99
 On the other hand, prosecutors in the United States do not 
 
 
the state. In this system, the trial is most accurately characterized as a continuation of the official 
investigation. The investigation, rather than the trial, is paramount.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 194. 
 94. Luna & Wade, supra note 19, at 1468–69 (“[T]he inquisitorial tradition displays a vision of 
the prosecutorial role as nonpartisan public service. European criminal justice systems typically charge 
prosecutors with a duty to be completely objective in their pursuit of the truth, based on a belief in the 
existence of a ‘substantive’ or ‘material’ truth that can be determined by a dispassionate fact-finder. 
Continental prosecutors assume a high degree of independence in their activities and are frequently 
associated with the judicial function, thereby reinforcing the expectation to act with a degree of 
detachment, assisting the courts in achieving the criminal justice system’s goal of discovering the truth 
and reacting appropriately to it. The extent to which prosecutors live up to such expectations is 
uncertain and perhaps inherently opaque, and the notion of complete objectivity will sound 
preposterous to many scholars. Nonetheless, the basic ideal deeply affects the way in which European 
prosecutors view their role and work.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 95. Moohr, supra note 54, at 194. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 194–45. 
 98. Id. (“In France, all magistrates (a group that includes both prosecutorial and judicial officers) 
are selected to the judicial magistracy on the basis of a highly competitive national examination taken 
after three years of law school.”). 
 99. Id. (“In France, service as a prosecutor or magistrate is a life-long career. The prosecutor is a 
civil servant, working within a highly centralized national bureaucratic hierarchy that provides 
possibilities for advancement and job security. . . . One effect of this long-term employment prospect 
is that prosecutors and magistrates are more accountable and responsive to their supervisors. They do 
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receive this kind of specialized training, nor do they have to make the 
same commitment to a life of public service.
100
 In the federal system, U.S. 
Attorneys are selected as part of the political process, and they might 
receive their positions based on political alliances rather than on an 
objective standard of merit.
101
 The French model can provide a guide for 
how the plea-bargaining process can be regarded in the future. Erik Luna 
and Marianne Wade suggest that the prosecutor’s role can be re-
envisioned as that of a career civil servant who is specially trained and 
advances by merit.
102
 These prosecutors would not be judged based on 
conviction rates but based on their ability to discover the truth.
103
  
IV. DEVELOPING AN ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURE TO DETER ETHICAL 
VIOLATIONS AND CRONYISM BY TAKING THE ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL 
AS A GUIDE  
A. Potential Guidelines for Plea Bargaining 
If we view plea bargaining through the lens of the administrative and 
quasi-inquisitorial model, then the first logical step is to consider the 
possibility of introducing guidelines and supervisorial oversight to the 
plea-bargaining process. In their article, The Screening/Bargaining 
Tradeoff, Ronald Wright and Marc Miller propose a set of internal 
guidelines to steer the prosecutorial process.
104
 The authors argue that the 
prosecutor’s office should adopt a sophisticated screening process at all 
 
 
not have to be concerned with re-appointment when political administrations change, and their 
prospects improve if they are deemed to function effectively.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 195–96.  
 102. Luna & Wade, supra note 19, at 1512 (“In recent years, prominent scholars have endorsed 
this approach, drawing on concepts from other legal traditions as a remedy for hyper-adversarialism in 
American criminal justice. For example, Michael Tonry has argued for the professionalization of 
prosecutors as career civil servants, specially trained and appointed based on merit, along the lines of 
the European model.”) (citing MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN 
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 207 (2004)). 
 103. Id. at 1469 (“As an independent body with an affiliation with the judiciary, prosecutors of 
continental Europe are likely to have quite different aims and motivations than their counterparts 
working in truly adversarial settings. Success is not measured by convictions, and acquittals are not 
seen as failures. Instead, continental prosecutors are supposed to find the truth and achieve evenhanded 
outcomes. This expectation and the concomitant job culture affect discretionary decision-making and 
encourage case-ending solutions that comport with the interests of justice, whatever those interests 
may be. While it would be naïve to assume that prosecutors will ‘get it right’ every time, given 
enormous time pressures and typically limited information, there is no evidence that prosecutors in the 
study countries are led by anything other than a judicially informed vision of truth and fairness.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 104. Wright & Miller, supra note 19.  
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steps of the plea process.
105
 Wright and Miller would use the screening 
process as a means to replace the system of negotiated pleas with a system 
of open pleas.
106
 Their hope is to create a much more honest system where 
it is far less likely to have the reasons behind a plea bargain hidden behind 
closed doors.
107
  
The Department of Justice also has internal guidelines to help federal 
prosecutors make discretionary choices.
108
 The problem with these 
guidelines is that the individual defendant has no recourse.
109
 In fact, many 
plea bargains include a waiver of appellate rights that would go so far as to 
completely preclude any review of the prosecutor’s decisions in 
accordance with the guidelines.
110
 Plus, an appeal for a guideline violation 
is almost never successful.
111
 Internal enforcement, conducted by the 
Office of Professional Responsibility, cannot always cover all of the 
 
 
 105. Id. at 32 (“First, the prosecutor’s office must make an early and careful assessment of each 
case, and demand that police and investigators provide sufficient information before the initial charge 
is filed. Second, the prosecutor’s office must file only appropriate charges. Which charges are 
‘appropriate’ is determined by several factors. A prosecutor should only file charges that the office 
would generally want to result in a criminal conviction and sanction. In addition, appropriate charges 
must reflect reasonably accurately what actually occurred. They are charges that the prosecutor can 
very likely prove in court. Third, and critically, the office must severely restrict all plea bargaining, 
and most especially charge bargains. Prosecutors should also recognize explicitly that the screening 
process is the mechanism that makes such restrictions possible. Fourth, the kind of prosecutorial 
screening we advocate must include sufficient training, oversight, and other internal enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure reasonable uniformity in charging and relatively few changes to charges after 
they have been filed.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 106. Id. at 33. According to the authors, the pleas would include obtaining information from 
judges about what a likely sentence might be, or even actually negotiate with judges.  
 107. Id. at 34. “Jurisdictions that implement the screening/bargaining tradeoff will be more honest 
and more accessible.” Id. 
 108. Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice”, 13 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 169 (2004) (“Internal ‘guidelines’ of the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) assist federal prosecutors in making the decisions that fall within their discretionary realm. 
These internal guidelines, usually found in the United States Attorneys’ Manual, provide government 
prosecutors with guidance in making decisions. Although these guidelines are policy statements and 
not legislative rules, they offer an element of consistency to the decision-making process, provide 
education for newcomers to the department, and can serve as a restraint on prosecutorial discretion.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 175–76 (“[C]ases that terminated with the entry of a plea agreement would preclude 
review of a guideline violation, since plea agreements routinely include waivers of appellate rights.”).  
 111. Id. at 177 (“In almost all cases, the defense is unsuccessful in raising as an appellate issue a 
violation of the DOJ guidelines. Courts find that absent an ‘independent constitutional’ basis, there is 
no basis for judicial enforcement of the guidelines. A different result is seen, however, when the 
government admits the violation and seeks to correct its mistake. In these limited instances, the 
authority of the government to remedy a DOJ violation is allowed. Finally, courts will not use their 
supervisory power to enforce a DOJ guideline if the sole basis for the argument is that a federal 
prosecutor violated internal policy.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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violations that occur.
112
 In addition, it is difficult to conduct supervision 
over offices extending throughout the country.
113
 These factors combine to 
make enforcement of the Department of Justice internal guidelines very 
difficult.   
Michael O’Hear’s article, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From 
Consultation to Guidelines, provides another possibility by suggesting that 
there is a need for some kind of guidance of prosecutorial discretion in 
plea bargaining to take into account the opinions of victims.
114
 O’Hear 
argues for prosecutorial charging and plea-bargaining guidelines to protect 
victims’ rights.115 He suggests standard plea deals for commonly recurring 
crimes.
116
 This would involve the consideration of different variables to 
modify the crime and the plea bargain offered.
117
 Further, this would 
produce a degree of procedural justice that would assist greatly in the 
process.
118
 If parties are treated in a procedurally fair way, then they are 
more likely to accept the outcome.
119
 Further, the use of objective criteria 
by prosecutors is likely to engender a sense of fairness and neutrality in 
the proceeding in the other parties involved.
120
 Thus, by using a set of 
guidelines, a prosecutor can negate many of the negative perceptions of his 
 
 
 112. Id. at 186–89 (“Internal discipline within the Department of Justice is conducted through its 
Office of Professional Responsibility. This office, which reports directly to the Attorney General, is 
responsible for investigating allegations that Department of Justice attorneys have engaged in 
misconduct in connection with their duties to investigate, represent the government in litigation, or 
provide legal advice. In past years, the internal enforcement process of the Office of Professional 
Responsibility has been criticized for inadequately handling the disciplinary process.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) . 
 113. Id. at 189 (“In considering guideline adherence, it is important to note the dual structure of 
the Department of Justice. On one level there is the Washington, D.C. office, the location of the Office 
of Professional Responsibility and the Executive Office of the United States Attorney. On the second 
tier are the 93 offices located throughout the country, supervised by individual United States 
Attorneys. Although monitoring can occur at both levels, the reporting of guideline violations occurs 
at the main Justice Department office.”). 
 114. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 323 (2007).  
 115. Id. at 325. 
 116. Id. at 335–36.  
 117. Id. at 336–37 (“[A] set of prosecutorial guidelines designed to identify a standard offense of 
conviction to be sought in ordinary cases simply need not deal with the full range of real-world 
complexity.”). 
 118. Id. at 340.  
 119. Id. (“[I]f victims are treated in a way that is perceived to be procedurally just, they are more 
likely to accept the outcomes of their cases, feel respect for the authorities, and regard the law as 
something they ought to obey.”). 
 120. Id. at 340–41 (“Thus, prosecutors may further procedural justice ends by employing 
guidelines that are built around objective offense and offender characteristics, as in my sample robbery 
guideline. That way, even when a victim feels disappointed with the way his or her case was resolved, 
the victim may nonetheless have confidence that the outcome was nothing personal—the prosecutor 
was just adhering to the predetermined, general norms.”). 
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power brought on by the nature of the plea-bargaining process. The great 
trouble with these kinds of guidelines is that they are notoriously difficult 
to enforce as well as being few and far between.
121
 
Another possible proposal is that it might not be necessary for the 
prosecutor to bargain with defense counsel at all. Although the criminal 
defendant does have leverage with which to bargain in stretching out the 
process and costing the prosecutor time and money by exercising his 
procedural rights,
122
 the common idea of bargaining may not be applicable 
in the usual case. As Gerard E. Lynch puts it, 
the typical guilty plea process already bears far more indicia of an 
adjudication by the responsible government agency of a defendant’s 
arguments that he should not be found guilty, or should be found 
culpable only to a limited degree, or should only be punished a 
certain amount, than of a commercial transaction.
123
 
The role of the prosecutor to try to come to the correct outcome would be 
the same in the administrative model.
124
 Thus, the prosecutor could act 
according to objective norms. However our system is so firmly entrenched 
in the archetype of adversarialism that such a change seems very unlikely. 
B. A Possibility in the Administrative Model 
Following the administrative example, and the examples of the 
supervisorial oversight provided in inquisitorial systems described 
above,
125
 it makes sense to devise a method by which the decisions of the 
independent American prosecutor can be documented without sacrificing 
discretion. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) provides an 
 
 
 121. Luna & Wade, supra note 19, at 1419–20 (“Lawmakers also have been wary to hamper 
prosecutors and instead have facilitated the prosecutorial function through the passage of more crimes 
and harsher punishments. As for internal guidelines, some prosecution offices have adopted policies on 
charging, plea bargaining, and other crucial decisions. These constraints are far from universal, 
however, and may be confidential, often employing hortatory language or pitched at a level of 
generality that confines little. Most importantly, they are not legally binding in court, and the lack of 
vigorous internal oversight and discipline has rendered such guidelines largely ineffective. In most 
cases, prosecutors can charge at will and preordain the ultimate resolution.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 122. Lynch, supra note 13, at 2132. 
 123. Id. at 2132–33. 
 124. Id. at 2135 (“[T]he prosecutor acts as the administrative decision-maker who determines, in 
the first instance, whether an accused will be subject to social sanction, and if so, how much 
punishment will be imposed. The prosecutor does not sit, in this process, as a neutral fact-finder 
adjudicating between adversarial parties, nor as the representative of one interest negotiating on an 
equal footing with an adversary, but as an inquisitor seeking the ‘correct’ outcome.”). 
 125. Moohr, supra note 54, at 192–93. 
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example of an American law that mandates an administrative policy where 
the procedures of decision-making are strongly enforced.
126
  
NEPA requires that all federal agencies must produce an 
Environmental Impact Statement for all major federal actions that might 
significantly affect the quality of the environment.
127
 This, in effect, 
requires all government agencies to follow a particular procedure 
whenever they seek to take an action that could have the proscribed 
effects, and if they do not, they are unable to take that action until they do, 
subject to judicial review.
128
 NEPA does not affect the ability of a federal 
agency to make whatever decision it believes warranted after it conducts 
the proper procedure,
129
 it only requires that the agency must follow the 
prescribed procedure and consider all alternatives to the action.
130
 Of 
course, administrative action involving a requirement to create an 
Environmental Impact Statement
131
 is different in scale from prosecutors’ 
making a decision on charges and a plea offer. It is, however, still possible 
to extend the idea of a required administrative process to plea bargaining.  
A prosecutor can be required, through guidelines, or, in the extreme 
case, a statute, to follow a certain procedure in order to be allowed to 
proceed with plea bargaining. This would not take away any of the 
prosecutor’s discretion. Instead, it would merely force the prosecutor to 
consider all of the alternatives and the reasons for making a decision, in a 
similar way to NEPA and administrative agency decision-making. There 
would then be a record trail that could be reviewable if necessary to 
provide real oversight in the administrative model over the prosecutorial 
function,
132
 as well as allowing for a log of decisions for the prosecutor to 
 
 
 126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012). 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (“[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . identify and 
develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality 
established by subchapter II of this chapter, which will insure that presently unquantified 
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along 
with economic and technical concerns.”). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–35. 
 129. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) 
(holding that courts must respect the legitimate policy choices of federal agencies). 
In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate 
policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such 
policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are 
not judicial ones: ‘Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.’ 
Id. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.  
 132. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than on 
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a 
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consult. The Administrative Procedure Act requires administrative 
agencies to follow certain procedures in their executive rule-making 
process.
133
 This would be similar in that it would require prosecutors to 
follow a prescribed procedure and document their decision-making 
process in a reviewable record when they make a plea offer.  
Therefore, in order to provide the necessary oversight to ensure 
fairness and consistency in the plea-bargaining process, prosecutors should 
be required, subsequent to the formal acceptance of a plea agreement, to 
provide detailed reasons in writing as to why a certain plea deal was 
offered to a supervising attorney or prosecutor.
134
 It has been suggested 
that prosecutors’ offices should do more to instill a sense of duty and 
fairness in their young prosecutors to work in the interests of justice.
135
 
But by forming a system of review by more senior and experienced 
attorneys who have been specially trained, they can fairly determine what 
a proper plea bargain should be and help in the process of instilling this 
ideal of fairness into the young prosecutors. Even if the supervisor would 
only glance at the document without giving it much scrutiny, the mere 
process of creating the document would force the prosecutor to really 
think through the reasons for why he wants to make a particular plea offer 
and provide a tangible record that the prosecutor could review. The system 
could be established either by guidelines or by the enactment of a statute. 
Because such a requirement would only require a few minutes of the 
prosecutor’s time, it should not create the dreaded and onerous time, 
financial and human resources burdens. Further, no discretion would be 
taken away from prosecutors because they would still be able to make 
whatever decisions they deem best, as long as they followed the prescribed 
procedure and created the report. The procedure would, however, force 
prosecutors to take a more detailed look at the decisions they make, and 
have made, as they will be subject to review from a supervising attorney 
 
 
case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices 
made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and 
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: Our 
Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).  
 134. See Moohr, supra note 54, at 197 (“Prosecutors in continental systems are supervised to a 
much greater extent than federal prosecutors and, in comparison, have much less discretionary 
authority.”). 
 135. Lynch, supra note 13, at 2148–49 (“[A] well-run district attorney’s or United States 
Attorney’s office must do whatever it can—as the best such offices already do—to instill a sense of 
fairness in the mostly young lawyers who serve on the front lines. Far more important than any rule 
permitting defense attorneys to be heard is the spirit in which such hearings are conducted. Prosecutors 
should be trained to approach their determinations of appropriate dispositions in a spirit of fairness and 
neutrality, as befits a governmental decision deeply adverse to a member of the community.”). 
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or prosecutor working from an objective perspective, perhaps 
incorporating suggested guidelines for what plea deals are appropriate in 
certain commonly recurring case types.  
In such a system, the degree of increased oversight would help weed 
out the possibility of improper reasons driving prosecutorial decisions 
because the prosecutor would have to provide reasons for his decisions 
that could survive the scrutiny of an experienced supervising attorney, as 
well as reinforcing internal consistency in decisions over time. While not 
perfect, this process might help alleviate many of the complaints against 
the plea-bargaining system and goes beyond effectively unenforceable 
guidelines that have been proposed in the past.
136
 Even if such a record 
would end up not being not judicially reviewable, it could still be effective 
in forcing prosecutors to more thoroughly consider the decisions they 
make in the plea-bargaining process and even possibly expose them to 
some external public scrutiny.
137
 
C. Possibility of Being Incorporated with Potential Charging Guidelines  
Another possibility is to incorporate these suggested procedures into a 
set of charging guidelines. A valuable comparison that can be made is to 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
138
 which provide guidance to the 
judiciary in making sentencing decisions. The goals of the Guidelines are 
to “enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime 
through an effective, fair sentencing system.”139 The Guidelines attempt to 
 
 
 136. Luna & Wade, supra note 19, at 1499; see generally Wright & Miller, supra note 19 
(suggesting a prosecutorial case-screening process that would weed out weak cases early to prevent 
overcharging and unfair plea bargains. However, this proposal is completely reliant upon the voluntary 
participation of prosecutors’ offices and provides no reviewability or assurance that such a program 
would every actually be followed). 
 137. ROBERT PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 932–33 (6th ed. 2009) (quoting ROBER 
DREHER, NEPA UNDER SEIGE (2005)).  
NEPA’s most significant effect has been to deter federal agencies from bringing forward 
proposed projects that could not withstand public examination and debate . . . . More broadly, 
NEPA has had pervasive effects on the conduct and thinking of federal administrative 
agencies . . . . NEPA has succeeded in expanding public engagement in government decision-
making, improving the quality of agency decisions and fulfilling principles of democratic 
governance that are central to our society . . . . In sum, NEPA functions as a critical tool for 
democratic government decision-making, establishing an orderly, clear framework for 
involving the public in major decisions affecting their lives and communities. 
Id. 
 138. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (2011). 
 139. Id. § 1A1.3. 
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balance uniformity with proportionality,
140
 meaning that they attempt to 
provide a guide without taking away the discretion of the judge. The 
guidelines for the prosecutor in plea bargaining could strive for a similar 
result. Although preserving the essential elements of prosecutorial 
discretion, the potential guidelines could still act as a guide as to what 
would normally be acceptable. If such guidelines were created, the 
procedural requirement suggested here would not be in conflict with them. 
The process of requiring that the prosecutor provide a rationale to a 
supervising attorney for why he wants to make a particular plea deal will 
work in tandem with any guidelines that might be developed, as it will 
give them the opportunity to explain their reasons for departing from the 
normative sentences and justify that decision. Just such a process is what 
is envisioned here, inspired by an administrative and inquisitorial model of 
the role of the prosecutor.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Plea bargaining has taken a prominent place in the practice of criminal 
law in the United States, accounting for the vast majority of convictions in 
criminal cases. It has correspondingly become an issue that cannot be 
ignored, and has been granted legitimacy by the United States Supreme 
Court in recent cases like Lafler and Frye.
141
 In fact, it appears to have 
become the predominant system of American criminal justice, and cannot 
be ignored or lambasted as the unfortunate by-product of our traditional 
 
 
 140. Id. (“[T]he guidelines represent an approach that begins with, and builds upon, empirical 
data. The guidelines will not please those who wish the commission to adopt a single philosophical 
theory and then work deductively to establish a simple and perfect set of categorizations and 
distinctions. The guidelines may prove more acceptable, however, to those who seek more modest, 
incremental improvements in the status quo, who believe the best is often the enemy of the good, and 
who recognize that these guidelines are, as the Act contemplates, but the first step in an evolutionary 
process. After spending considerable time and resources exploring alternative approaches, the 
Commission developed these guidelines as a practical effort toward the achievement of a more honest, 
uniform, equitable, proportional, and therefore effective sentencing system.”). 
 141. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397–98 (2012) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today, however, the Supreme Court of the United States elevates plea 
bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement. It is no longer a somewhat 
embarrassing adjunct to our criminal justice system; rather, as the Court announces in the companion 
case to this one, ‘it is the criminal justice system.’ . . . Thus, even though there is no doubt that the 
respondent here is guilty of the offense with which he was charged; even though he has received the 
exorbitant gold standard of American justice—a full-dress criminal trial with its innumerable 
constitutional and statutory limitations upon the evidence that the prosecution can bring forward, and 
(in Michigan as in most States) the requirement of a unanimous guilty verdict by impartial jurors; the 
Court says that his conviction is invalid because he was deprived of his constitutional entitlement to 
plea-bargain.”). 
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adversarial process. Instead, it must be embraced for what it is and dealt 
with in a manner commensurate with its essential nature as an inherently 
administrative process. But such a system raises many procedural and 
ethical problems that need to be addressed, such as when caseloads of 
prosecutors and defense attorneys become overburdened and the 
relationships between attorneys become too casual and too close. These 
problems can be addressed, and it would be unwise to ignore them any 
longer. Only when we accept the reality of plea bargaining as it actually 
exists can we take steps to improve it and deal with the problems for 
prosecutors and defendants alike.   
Thus, looking at the system of plea bargaining as something akin to an 
administrative or inquisitorial system of criminal justice, we can 
incorporate an element of administrative oversight into the process by 
requiring prosecutors to fill out forms describing the reasoning behind a 
plea deal that can be reviewed by a supervising attorney. This process can 
help foster a culture of accountability through more senior attorneys 
translating their experiences and training down the ranks to the younger 
and greener attorneys who have not had the same experiences. A log of 
prior plea offers could also be generated, helping foster consistency in 
future plea bargains. Further, we can supplement the review of these more 
senior attorneys by providing them with objective criteria, similar to the 
sentencing guidelines provided to the judiciary, that help guide decisions 
about what kind of plea bargains are appropriate in certain situations. Such 
a prescribed process will serve to remove the perception of unfairness out 
of the process without taking away the discretion of the prosecutors who 
ultimately need to be allowed to make decisions unique to individual 
situations. And this can be done by merely mandating a mentoring role for 
more senior attorneys that should already exist in the most effective 
prosecutor’s offices throughout the country, and by fostering a culture of 
justification for all the decisions that are made in plea bargaining. The 
prosecutors can still make any decision that they would like, provided they 
follow the proper procedure. They would simply be subject to more 
significant levels of scrutiny. Following this proposal, the concerns 
surrounding plea bargaining can be somewhat alleviated without placing a 
new onerous burden upon an already overburdened criminal justice 
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system. The hope is that only a small additional obligation that a 
responsible prosecutor’s office would undoubtedly be following regardless 
be placed upon prosecutors and their offices.  
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